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EQUAL FAVORITISM UNDER THE LAW AND
INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN REDISTRICTING
Terry Smith*
Recently, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens was joined on the United
States Supreme Court by a new Chief Justice who subscribed to this view
about amending section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
As Justice Stewart correctly noted in his opinion in City of Mobile v.
Bolden, incorporation of an effects test in §2 would establish essentially a
quota system for electoral politics by creating a right to proportional
racial representation on elected governmental bodies. Such a result is
fundamentally inconsistent with this Nation's history of popular
sovereignty. 1
Chief Justice John Roberts's ascension to the Supreme Court augurs a
prismatic polarity on the Court between its most junior Justice and its most
senior, Justice Stevens, on questions concerning the democratic process.
Reasonable people might interpret our nation's history of popular
sovereignty quite differently than Roberts did as a young stalwart of the
Reagan revolution: Quotas of the worst sort have abounded, creating
elective bodies that are disproportionately white and often unresponsive to
the concerns of voters of color.
Compositions of multimember offices are seldom random acts of nature;
rather, they are nearly always products of someone's design. Justice
Stevens's more conservative colleagues on the Court have recognized this
reality in the context of the partisan gerrymander. 2 Yet they have insisted
on a race neutrality standard in redistricting that has reinforced a
disproportionate quota for white voters and white representatives. Perhaps
more than any current member of the Court, Justice Stevens has sought to
fashion a coherent melding of the constitutional protections implicated in
redistricting and apportionment. As early as 1972, when he was a judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens
argued that all groups with the potential strength to elect their own
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. 1986, Brown University; J.D.
1989, New York University School of Law.
1. Memorandum from John Roberts to the United States Attorney General, Why
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Should Be Retained Unchanged (Dec. 22, 1981), available
at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/030-black-binderl/
folder030.pdf.
2. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 326 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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members-whether racial, ethnic, religious, or political-are entitled to the
same protections from gerrymandering. 3
As a corollary to his insistence on a symmetrical gerrymandering
doctrine, Justice Stevens has consistently argued that, when a group in
power draws district lines to benefit underrepresented groups, the dominant
group does not engage in a form of gerrymandering condemned by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4  These two
postulates-purporting to afford interest groups equal dignity in the
redistricting process-coexist uncomfortably in the eyes of many.
Conservatives on the Court have attacked these propositions as ignoring the
special status of race under the Constitution. Progressive voting rights
scholars have critiqued Justice Stevens's three-part test for determining the
permissibility of a gerrymander (discussed below) as far too deferential to
jurisdictions prone to discriminate against minority voters. Relatedly, at a
time when section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is up for renewal, and
when there is doubt to whether Congress and the executive branch will
continue to compel states to conduct remedial redistricting, Justice
Stevens's approach to constitutional vote-dilution claims may unwittingly
license states to further ignore minority interests. Finally, for all Justice
Stevens's and commentators' concerns about the legislative gerrymander,
there may be an even worse alternative for white voters and voters of color
alike-that is, giving voters themselves final say over redistricting plans.
The latter course was recently rejected by voters in California who defeated
Proposition 77. A brief examination of the foregoing strands of the
gerrymandering debate helps map the broader controversies surrounding
redistricting.
A perusal of the redistricting cases from the past decade or so reveals a
foundational disagreement between Justice Stevens and the Court's
conservatives. Justice Stevens imposes a duty on state legislatures to
govern impartially in the context of redistricting with respect to all interest
groups, by whatever characteristics they are defined. 5 This duty, derived
from the government's broader duty of impartiality under the Equal
Protection Clause, is breached when the state "discriminates against a
political minority for the sole and unadorned purpose of maximizing the
3. See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
4. See Shaw v. Reno, where Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, stated,
The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the
electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political
strength at the expense of any weaker group. That duty, however, is not violated
when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks
such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature-whether
that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by
religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics.
509 U.S. 630, 677-78 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the line-drawing process,
racial, religious, ethnic, and economic gerrymanders are all species of political
gerrymanders." (internal quotations omitted)).
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power of the majority."'6 But the majority's decision to enhance the power
of a political minority-even a racial one-involves no unconstitutional
self-dealing. Where the political minority is a racial one, Justice Stevens's
mandate of impartiality becomes a warrant for equal favoritism:
If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation
for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish
Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible
to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose
history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause....
A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. 7
What Justice Stevens sees as a perversion, however, is the very predicate
of the Court's wrongful districting cases from Shaw v. Reno forward, and of
the conservatives' differentiation between the justiciability of partisan and
racial gerrymanders. How can such a wide gulf exist between what we
hope are intelligent jurists of good intentions? Conservative justices make
three assumptions that simultaneously explain and discredit their approach
to redistricting.
Their principal assumption is that race is different from all other
characteristics in the redistricting process.8 This argument flows from
general equal protection doctrine under which racial categories are deemed
to be the most suspect.9 But here, the conservatives on the Court are doing
nothing more than using the nation's history of racial discrimination against
its most visible victims. The conservatives argue, in effect, that since our
nation's past has rendered it necessary to make race a generally prohibited
criterion, efforts to rectify the effects of that history will be subject to the
same scrutiny as conduct that reflects that history. This contortion of
reason has been lambasted by fellow Justices10 and scholars alike, 1 but in
the redistricting context its consequences are especially pernicious.
Districting that is other than random-which would describe most
districting-is necessarily about favoritism for some groups based on group
characteristics. The other contexts in which race-based equal protection
concerns arise, such as employment and higher education, do not, we hope,
6. Id.
7. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. Justice Stevens writes,
[N]othing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political
gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. In fact, our
country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as
our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest
scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race[]-would seem to compel the
opposite conclusion.
Id. at 650 (citations omitted); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292-93 (plurality opinion).
9. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
11. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,
96 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1997).
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reflect a similar endeavor. Since group favoritism is the coin of the realm
in redistricting, doctrines which impede equal favoritism, as color blindness
does, are inherently discriminatory.
The Supreme Court's conservatives also harbor an abiding yet naive
belief that they are capable of distinguishing race from politics as such in
redistricting. As Justice Scalia recently stated in his plurality opinion in
Veith v. Jubelirer, which held partisan gerrymanders to be nonjusticiable,
the purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race is not a lawful one,
and is much more rarely encountered. Determining whether the shape of
a particular district is so substantially affected by the presence of a rare
and constitutionally suspect motive as to invalidate it is quite different
from determining whether it is so substantially affected by the excess of
an ordinary and lawful motive [e.g., politics] as to invalidate it. 12
Justice Scalia assumes that the disproportionate number of white elective
districts across our nation lack a racial identity, and that redistricting criteria
that are not explicitly racial--e.g., political conservatism, anti-affirmative
action, antisocial programs, anti-busing--can be untethered in each instance
from their racial origins. 13 Yet politics on the ground reveal a very
different story.
Lee Atwater, the former chairman of the Republican National Committee
and the architect of George H. Bush's highly racialized presidential
campaign against Michael Dukakis, spoke candidly about the linkage
between modem conservatism and old-style segregation:
You start out in 1954 by saying "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you
can't say "nigger"-that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like
forced busing, states' rights, and all that stuff. You're getting so abstract
now [that] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're
talking about are totally economic things and a by-product of them is
[that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that
is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that
abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem
one way or the other. You follow me-because obviously sitting around,
"we want to cut this," is much more abstract than even the busing thing
and a hell of a lot more abstract than "Nigger, nigger." 14
Atwater was describing a process of "rearticulation" in which racial
regression merges with broader concerns of economic stagnation and
cultural malaise to produce a new nomenclature for anti-black rhetoric. 15
12. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion).
13. For a discussion of how the Court has failed to acknowledge the racial dimension of
the two-party political system in the United States, see Terry Smith, A Black Party?
Timmons, Black Backlash, and the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 Duke L.J. 1, 25,
40-41 (1998).
14. Alexander P. Lamis, Southern Politics in the 1990s, at 8 (1999) (alteration in the
original).
15. See Michael Omi, Shifting the Blame: Racial Ideology and Politics in the Post-Civil
Rights Era, 18 Critical Scientology 77, 92 (1991). Rearticulation of traditional racism is not
2262 [Vol. 74
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This process cannot be dismissed as merely anecdotal, for "a sizable body
of research suggests that direct measures of racism are, in fact, strongly
correlated both with opposition to affirmative action and conservatism. '1 6
To be sure, social scientists continue to debate the degree to which racial
predispositions affect policy preferences, 17 but amidst this debate it is
simply intellectually dishonest to assume the race neutrality of white
districts. The pubic opinion data simply do not support such a
presupposition. On matters concerning race, black/white differences of
thirty-five percent to fifty percent are the norm.18 Even on nonracial issues,
such as government social welfare and education spending, black/white
differences of twenty percent are typical. 19 Thus, districts created along a
conservative-liberal axis are likewise divided along a racial axis.
The same is true of partisan gerrymandering, particularly in the South. It
is now an uncontroversial proposition that partisan realignment occurred in
the South because conservative whites abandoned the Democratic Party in
reaction to its embrace of civil rights.20 How, then, can Republican districts
in the South, the situs of the Court's efforts to dismantle majority-black
districts, be considered race neutral? The history of partisan realignment
after 1964 is not an "original sin" irrelevant to constitutional analysis. 21
That realignment's effects continue today, and "[t]he end result is that racial
attitudes have become a dominant axis of cleavage in the contemporary
American party system."2 2 Moreover, in its rash of decisions during the
1990s striking down newly created majority-minority congressional
districts, the Supreme Court made clear that a state may not perpetuate the
impermissible uses of race by basing a redistricting plan on districts that
limited to politics. Modem judicial conservatism's opposition to race-based remedies,
among other tenets, can reasonably be challenged as a pretext for racial regression. Cf
Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 64 (1995)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's rejection of affirmative action is "an act of racial
discrimination" because it allows conservative jurists to "appropriate societal resources
allocated by the political process to racial minorities and reallocate them to the white
majority").
16. Christopher M. Federico & Jim Sidanius, Racism, Ideology, and Affirmative Action
Revisited: The Antecedents and Consequences of 'Principled Objections' to Affirmative
Action, 82 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 488, 489 (2002).
17. See Vincent L. Hutchings & Nicholas A. Valentino, The Centrality of Race in
American Politics, 7 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 383, 389 (2004) ("The ensuing debate over the
impact of racial attitudes on policy preferences has been among the most contentious in all
of public opinion research.").
18. See id
19. See id.
20. Jonathan A. Cowden, Southernization of the Nation and Nationalization of the
South: Racial Conservatism, Social Welfare and White Partisans in the United States, 1956-
92, 31 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 277, 278 (2001).
21. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) ("[P]ast discrimination cannot,
in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.").
22. Cowden, supra note 20, at 278.
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were originally conceived with a predominately racial motive. 23 Absent
some seismic event that has purged the southern Republican Party of its
original racial raison d'etre, when Republican districts are today created in
the South, state governments in effect relent to the race-influenced policy
and partisan preferences of whites.24 If these districts do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, then black, Latino
and Asian districts created to mirror these constituencies' policy and
partisan preferences do not either. 25
The Supreme Court's conservatives, however, have ensnared themselves
in an implosive double standard. They have had no difficulty de-racializing
white voters, but they have become recalcitrant when voters of color have
sought similar treatment. In Easley v. Cromartie,26 the State of North
Carolina explained the forty-seven percent black composition of a
congressional district on grounds that blacks were disproportionately
Democratic, and the state sought to create a reliable Democratic district.27
Ever suspicious of a black district that exists by virtue of anything other
than residential segregation, Justice Thomas boasted an ability to untangle
race from partisanship, and he would have found the district an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander because race predominated in its
creation.28 Setting to one side the thin evidence on which Justice Thomas's
conclusion rests, 29 the problem for him and other conservatives on the
Court is their crude, stereotyped view of voters of color as being defined by
their race rather than a set of common political interests. 30
23. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 90 (1997) ("[T]he unconstitutional
predominance of race in the provenance of the Second and Eleventh Districts of the 1992
precleared plan caused them to be improper departure points .... ").
24. This argument should sit well with so-called "originalists." Originalists cannot
repair to historical understandings when doing so grandfathers racial inequality but disregard
history when it relays a story that justifies remedial action by the state.
25. The foregoing critique is applicable to regions outside the South, though to a lesser
extent. Since 1964, white partisans outside the South have shown a statistically significant
gap in their racial liberality. Cowden, supra note 20, at 297. Nationally, party identification
has become increasingly predictive of racial attitudes. See id. at 295 (stating that by 1992,
"the probability of identifying as a Republican increases by 23 per cent as one moves across
the race issue scale in a conservative direction, while the probability of identifying with the
Democratic party declines by the same amount").
26. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
27. See id. at 242 ("[North Carolina] has articulated a legitimate political explanation for
its districting decision, and the voting population is one in which race and political affiliation
are highly correlated.").
28. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 262-67.
30. The portrayal of black and Latino politics as nonideological and race based is not
limited to conservatives. New York City was last among major American cities to elect a
black mayor and remains the only not to have reelected one. So-called moderate white
politicians do not hesitate to race-bait when pitted against a black opponent, as Rudolph
Guiliani did in defeating New York Mayor David Dinkins. Guiliani accused Dinkins of
repairing "into black victimization" to excuse his performance as mayor. Todd S. Purdum,
Giuliani Ousts Dinkins by a Thin Margin; Whitman Is an Upset Winner Over Florio, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1993, at Al. Moreover, news media and commentators accessed by the news
media-who are overwhelmingly white-similarly paganize black and Latino politics.
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Suppose the State of North Carolina sought to draw a congressional
district that would elect a representative who would support such issues as
reparations, affirmative action, and statehood for the District of Columbia?
Since polling and other evidence shows that there is appreciably greater
support for such issues among black voters than among whites,31 surely it
would make sense to include large numbers, if not a majority, of black
voters. Would such a district be a race-based district? If the answer is
affirmative merely because the underlying issues themselves have to do
with race, then once again, a number of Republican, conservative districts
would have to be dismantled-particularly in the South-for surely race-
based concerns are often part of the issue mix that yields political
conservatism. 32 Moreover, the censoring of voters' political interests-i.e.,
some concerns deserve protection in redistricting, others do not-threatens
to run afoul of the First Amendment's freedoms of association and speech.
Yet the conservatives on the Court consistently dissemble white political
interests as something other than racial, and censor minority political
interests by myopically focusing on the racial compositions and
configurations of black and Latino districts. The result is that whites can
empower their ideologies through the redistricting process while black and
Latino efforts to do the same are either suspect or prohibited.
A variation on the foregoing heuristic will amplify the point. While it is
true that the black/white opinion divide on issues directly implicating race
is substantial, imagine the existence in one state of a large number of white
"black sympathizers." Like black voters in Shaw, these black sympathizers
are dispersed throughout the state such that drawing a congressional district
in which they are a majority will necessarily entail drawing a less compact
district. The state does so anyway. Could Shaw's "analytically distinct"
Recently, when billionaire Michael Bloomberg, who is white, won reelection as mayor of
New York City against a Latino opponent, political analysts touted Bloomberg's reelection
"as a triumph of competence over the ideology, ethnic politics, and partisan appeals that
were at the heart of the campaign of Mr. [Fernando] Ferrer." Patrick D. Healy, Ferrer
Defeated: Democrats Are Locked Out of City Hall for 4th Straight Term, N.Y. Times, Nov.
9, 2005, at Al.
31. A June 2003 Gallup Poll asked, "Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative
action programs for racial minorities?" Seventy percent of blacks responded that they
favored such programs, while only forty-four percent of whites so responded, a gap of
twenty-six percent. See PollingReport.com, Race and Ethnicity,
http://www.PollingReport.com/race.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). A January 2002
CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll asked, "Do you think the government should or should not
make cash payments to black Americans who are descendants of slaves?" Fifty-five percent
of the black respondents supported such reparations, while only six percent of the white
respondents did. Id. Although there was no available polling data on the question of
statehood for the District of Columbia-a predominantly black city-bills proposing
statehood or providing it with congressional representation have languished in Congress for
decades. District statehood is a racially charged yet racially coded political issue. Senator
Charles Robb of Virginia accused his opponent, Oliver North, of playing racial politics when
North derided the idea of District statehood, saying "I'm not going to be Marion Barry's lap
dog." Virginia: Injecting Race into the Race, The Hotline, Oct. 28, 1994. Marion Barry,
who is black, was the District's mayor at the time.
32. See supra notes 20-25.
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claim of race predominance apply to a group of white voters who have been
aggregated in the same district based on their support of black issues? If
the answer is yes, then whites aggregated based on their hostility to black
concerns-whether implicit or express-must be subject to Shaw as well.
If the answer is no, then there is no reason to treat dispersed black voters,
aggregated to advance their mutual interests, any differently than the white
sympathizers.
The complexities involved in sorting politics from race should commend
to the Court a different approach. Justice Stevens has long been cognizant
of the inextricable relationship between race and politics, and between other
group characteristics and politics. The intertwined nature of these
phenomena led him, as an appellate judge, to observe,
[I]t is the parallel character of the voting of members of the group-rather
than the source of their common interests-that motivates the
gerrymander. Thus the motivation for the gerrymander is a function of
the political strength of the group at which it is directed. That motivation
is unaffected by the kind of characteristic-whether religious, economic,
or ethnic-that gives the group political cohesion. 33
By shifting its focus away from vote dilution-or what Justice Stevens
describes above as political strength-in Shaw to a motivational analysis,
the Court renders vulnerable to constitutional attack large numbers of white
electoral districts. In failing to apply the same motivational analysis to
white districts as to majority-minority districts, the conservatives on the
Court render vulnerable their judicial-indeed racial-impartiality.
Justice Stevens's attempt to apply gerrymandering protections to all
interest groups equally creates an inviting target for the charge of
proportional representation. Both Justice Stevens and his more
conservative colleagues, however, have disavowed any right to proportional
representation under the Constitution. 34  Thus, the third conservative
premise about redistricting is one which Justice Stevens appears to share.
33. Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 651-52 (1982), Justice Stevens, writing again
in dissent, stated,
It would be unrealistic to distinguish racial groups from other political groups on
the ground that race is an irrelevant factor in the political process.
Racial consciousness and racial association are not desirable features of our
political system. We all look forward to the day when race is an irrelevant factor in
the political process. In my opinion, however, that goal will best be achieved by
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination that motivate disadvantaged racial and
ethnic groups to vote as identifiable units. Whenever identifiable groups in our
society are disadvantaged, they will share common political interests and tend to
vote as a "bloc." In this respect, racial groups are like other political groups. A
permanent constitutional rule that treated them differently would, in my opinion,
itself tend to perpetuate race as a feature distinct from all others; a trait that makes
persons different in the eyes of the law.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).




The assumption that proportional representation is antithetical to our
constitutional design is a favorite red herring of conservatives on the
Court,35 who negatively critique proportional representation while offering
no positive vision of political equality. 36 Unlike his more conservative
colleagues, however, Justice Stevens has shown an ability to prescind the
specter of proportional representation and to directly address equality.37
His principle of equal favoritism suggests an appreciation that whatever the
fears of proportional representation, disproportionate white
representation-even when claimed as an entitlement of majority status-is
hardly a superior outcome, let alone one that the Constitution sanctions.
It is one thing to permit a state legislature or local government to district
in a politically and racially inclusive manner. It is quite another, however,
to set forth the standards of proof that a political or racial minority must
meet when it believes it has been the victim of a gerrymander. On this
score, Justice Stevens's jurisprudence might be described as inchoate and
evolving, at the very least. Justice Stevens originally proposed an analytical
framework that led to some curious outcomes, such as his voting to uphold
the Mobile, Alabama, commission form of government, under which that
city's black citizens had been unable to elect the candidates of their choice.
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, Justice Stevens offered a three-prong test to
determine the existence of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. A court
must conclude (1) the districting scheme was not the result of a "routine or
a traditional political decision," (2) the plan must have a significant adverse
impact on a minority group, and (3) the plan must be "unsupported by any
neutral justification and thus was either totally irrational or entirely
motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the minority." 38
Although he rightly condemns the subjective intent inquiry for Equal
Protection Clause violations, Stevens's original test for finding
35. For one of the more apoplectic denunciations of proportional representation in the
context of remedial districting for minority voters, see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We have involved the federal courts, and indeed the
Nation, in the enterprise of systematically dividing the country into electoral districts along
racial lines-an enterprise of segregating the races into political homelands that amounts, in
truth, to nothing short of a system of 'political apartheid."' (internal citation omitted)).
36. For a critique of the Court's actions in this area, see Sanford Levinson,
Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why
Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 257, 278 (1985). Conservatives' preoccupation with
proportional representation is especially peculiar in light of the results conservative Justices
have ordained in other voting rights decisions that seem far less consonant with our
constitutional design than proportional representation. A high school civics student, for
instance, would have a far easier time grasping the idea that political minorities, even when
defined in part by their race, are entitled to some representation, than they would
comprehending the Supreme Court's disallowing procedures to be established for the
counting of votes in Florida's presidential contest. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
The former precept forthrightly promotes equality. Bush v. Gore, on the other hand,
perpetuated inequality by disenfranchising those voters who voted with the least
technologically advanced machinery.
37. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 640 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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unconstitutional racial vote dilution is lacking. First, permitting a
government to justify a plan that dilutes minority voting strength because
that plan was adopted in a routine or traditional manner may grandfather the
practices of jurisdictions that routinely and traditionally ignore minority
interests in redistricting. 39  Equally objectionable is allowing the
government to escape liability by pointing to a so-called neutral
justification for its plan, when such justifications can often serve as mere
pretext.40
These shortcomings in no way obscure Justice Stevens's core
commitment to an equal playing field for minorities in the body politic, but
they nevertheless underscore a degree of intractability with regard to the
gerrymander. Holding political gerrymanders nonjusticiable while acting as
an omnipotent cartographer when states gerrymander to benefit racial
minorities-an approach advocated by the plurality in Vieth-seems itself
to offend notions of equal protection. In an effort to rid the Court's
districting jurisprudence of this inconsistency, Justice Stevens has more
recently advocated applying the predominance test of Shaw v. Reno and its
progeny to political gerrymandering cases: "Just as race can be a factor in,
but cannot dictate the outcome of, the districting process, so too can
partisanship be a permissible consideration in drawing district lines, so long
as it does not predominate." 41  Because Shaw is deeply flawed in its
conception of race and the interaction of race and politics, however, basing
an all-purpose gerrymandering test on it attains uniformity at too high a
cost. Moreover, although Justice Stevens appears correct that the objective
of the gerrymander is the same regardless of the characteristics of the group
to which it is directed, it is not at all clear that the harms to each group are
synonymous. The excesses of gerrymandering may be self-correcting in
some instances for some groups when an incumbent loses touch with his
district,42 but a racial minority whose interests are not part of a district's
political calculus to begin with has no such recourse.
The difficulties surrounding the gerrymander's doctrinal treatment are
rivaled handily by problems with proposed legislative and academic
solutions. Professor Lani Guinier has proposed substituting districts in
local elections for a system of semi-proportional representation, but any
such system would replicate at least some of the problems of at-large
elections and would in any event require legislative approval. Efforts to
make the redistricting process more random or neutral likewise provide no
panacea. Limiting redistricting criteria to the preservation of precinct,
39. See Barbara Y. Phillips, Reconsidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its
Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561, 580 n.99
(1995).
40. Id.
41. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 336 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See Robin Toner, Getting Pumped? Get Real, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2005, § 4, at 1
(quoting one political operative as saying, "Incumbents who lose touch with their district are
going to get beat").
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county, and city lines falsely assumes that important communities of
interests are formed only on the basis of geography rather than race or some
other characteristic. And blind redistricting, wherein the premium is placed
on not knowing pertinent information about voters, threatens to produce
even less representative, less responsive elective bodies.
Because many view the evil of the gerrymander as the deprivation of
voter choice, its opponents have turned to the voters themselves to
eliminate the gerrymander.43 These attempts, in California and Ohio, have
so far been unsuccessful. 44 There may be ample reasons to applaud their
defeats. California's Proposition 77 would have subjected redistricting
plans to voter approval in a statewide referendum. Whatever the attributes
of direct democracy, solicitude for minorities has not been one of them.
California's very recent history of successful voter initiatives against
affirmative action and benefits for illegal aliens are but two examples of
direct democracy's hostility to minority interests. Proposition 77 and
similar initiatives foreshadow a collision course between efforts to restrain
the presumed evil of the legislative gerrymander and Justice Stevens's long
insistence on equal dignity in the districting process.
Quite apart from such concerns, the notion that voters are wiser than
politicians ignores the reality that voters elect and re-elect politicians.45 In
placing an emphasis on voter choice, opponents of the gerrymander neglect
a long overdue examination of voter rationality.46 Groups of voters47
enable the current system by ratifying the results of the partisan
gerrymander rather than critically evaluating and voting in accordance with
their own interests. If there is finally to be intelligent design in
redistricting, we should first look to the voter for a measure of
accountability before we elicit from them reforms.
43. Richard L. Hasen, Supreme Court Got It Right In Pa. Redistricting Case, Roll Call,
May 3, 2004 (noting that twenty-four states have an initiative process in which "the voters
can make their own decisions about the appropriate role of the parties in the redistricting
process").
44. Editorial, Kaine and Reform, Richmond Times Dispatch (Va.), Nov. 27, 2005, at E2
(noting the defeats of referenda in California and Ohio to reduce partisan gerrymandering).
45. Cf Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1469, 1490 (2001)
(arguing that the campaign finance reform and term-limits movements reflected a lack of
self-governing capacity on the part of voters, who could "simply not vote for a candidate
who offends the principles of these two movements").
46. For an in-depth discussion of how conservative white voters act against their own
economic interests, see generally Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas? How
Conservatives Won the Heart of America (2004).
47. These are, by and large, white voters. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 45, at
1490. In the context of campaign finance reform, this author has argued,
Black voters lack the power of a controlling white majority, and, moreover, they
often display a political judgment that is substantially at variance with that of
white voters. It is difficult, then, to ascribe the same (self-inflicted) harms to them
as may be attributed to white voters.
Id. at 1491 (footnote omitted).
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